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I. INTRODUCTION
This comment focuses on the current law in Cuba affecting
real property, particularly in the areas of agriculture, housing, and
commercial enterprises (factories, shops, and the like). Much of the
information coming out of Cuba is anecdotal and contradictory. It
appears, moreover, that there may be considerable divergence
between the law on the books and the actual conditions existing in
the country: Recent constitutional reforms and legislation purport
to grant Cuban citizens the right to own their homes, farms, and
businesses. In reality, such rights appear to be so restrictive that
they can hardly be said to comport with classical notions of private
ownership of real property.
* B.A. with high distinction, Judson College; J.D. cum laude, University of
Wisconsin Law School; M.S.L.I. University of Wisconsin-Madison, LLM,
Harvard Law School; Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School
of Law. This comment was prepared in connection with a Miami symposium on
Cuban property law sponsored by the Cuban American Association in early
1994.
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At the time of the Revolution, Cuba had many of the
attributes of a developed country:
[M]ore than half of its population lived in urban
areas; the majority of both its urban and rural labor
force was composed of wage earners, most of
whom were unionized; and by some measures, its
standard of living, especially in the largest cities
rivalled that of Southern Europe. ... [T]hose who
made the Cuban revolution took over a country with
its economic and residential infrastructure largely
intact...'
Sadly, there has been a marked increase in the deterioration of
both the economy and residential infrastructure in the interim.2
II. AGRICULTURE
Article 20 of the 1976 Cuban constitution "recognizes the
right of small farmers to own their lands and other means and
implements of production. . . .,, This article also recognizes the
rights of small farmers to organize into agricultural cooperatives to
1. J. Hamberg, Cuba, 35 HOUSING POLICIES IN THE SOCIALIST THIRD WORLD
(K. Mathey ed., 1990). Even so, at the time of the Revolution about half of the
total housing stock of 1.4 million units was considered substandard. Id. at 37.
2. See, e.g., J.P. Rathbone, Cuba: Current Economic Situation and Short
Term Prospects, BULLETIN 20 (La Sociedad Economica 1992). Since early 1991
La Sociedad and its research director, John Paul Rathbone, have published a
series of very useful occasional bulletins on economic issues facing Cuba now
and in the future. Other bulletins relevant to this discussion are Private Propery
Rights in Cuba: Housing, BULLETIN 15 (La Sociedad Economica 1992)
[hereinafter BULLETIN 15] and Private Property Rights in Cuba: Farmland,
BULLETIN 16 (La Sociedad Economica 1992) [hereinafter BULLETIN 16].
3. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA, art. 20 (1976). [hereinafter
"CUBA CONST. "].
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constitute "a form of collective ownership on the part of the
peasants. ... "' Article 21 gives the small farmer the right to sell
his land "with the previous authorization of state agencies," yet the
state reserves the "preferential right to the purchase of the land
while paying a fair price."5 Article 24 limits the right to inherit
legal title to agricultural land to "heirs who are personally involved
in its cultivation," with apparently some exceptions. 6
While the legal right to hold a title to private property
appears to be constitutionally established,7 it is questionable whether
it is within traditional notions of private property.' Restrictions on
inheritance, an expansive right of first refusal reserved by the state,
and other limitations do not comport with classical notions of
private property. Moreover, one's freedom of action is
considerably restricted where the state controls transport, credit,
marketing, distribution, and agricultural inputs.
4. Id.
5. Id. art. 21.
6. Id. art. 24.
7. See infra § III.
8. As one group of reporters note:
[P]rivate farmers are private only in the sense that they own
their land and live mainly off the sale of their produce. But
unlike private farmers in capitalist countries, they cannot freely
sell their land, they must respond to the government's request
as to what to grow, they are dependent on the government for
inputs, and they must sell part of their produce to the
government at prices the government sets.
Benjamin, Collins & Scott, The Agrarian Revolution, in THE CUBA READER: THE
MAKING OF A REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY 97 (1989).
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An analysis for the division of land for farming provides an
example. There are four categories of farms in contemporary
Cuba:9
(a) State farms (representing roughly 83 % of cultivated
land);
(b) production cooperatives (7.8% of cultivated land);
(c) credit and services cooperatives (7.5 % of cultivated
land); and,
(d) small private farms (2.2% of cultivated land
representing some 20,000 recorded private
farmers). 10
These last three categories represent private or semi-private
arrangements. Each will be considered in turn.
First, however, some points must be made regarding land
registers. As La Sociedad reports, "[p]rior to the Revolution, all
land titles and land transfers were noted, at a municipal level, in
Rural Property Registers."11
Under the 1959 Agrarian Reform Law (Article 9),
the Ministry of Agriculture had to register all land
that had been confiscated by the State .... A final
provision to the law (No. 3) added that, with Cuba's
9. BULLETIN 16, supra note 2, at 1.
10. Another fairly recent source suggests that independent farmers, members
of the National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP), represent about a fifth of
all cultivated land in the country. M. Azicu, CUBA: POLITICs, ECONOMICS AND
SOCIETY 113 (1988). The source is unclear about whether this figure includes
farmers participating in the production cooperatives and the credit and services
coops.
11. BULLETIN 16, supra note 2, at 5.
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existing Property Register, the National Institute of
Agrarian Reform would create a rural property
register and that all land transfers, and subsequent
land transfers, should be duly noted in it.
12
The 1959 and 1963 Agrarian Reform Laws had the
combined effect of expropriating some 63 % of Cuba's crop and
pasture land. 13 Farms thus expropriated were those in excess of
five "cabellerias," where one cabelleria equals 13.4 hectares.
Farms under roughly sixty-seven hectares were retained by about
forty-five thousand farmers. In addition, the various agrarian
reform acts vested ownership in small parcels to over 100,000 small
farmers, mostly tenants, sharecroppers, and squatters. Over time,
the government has "encouraged" these small holders to sell their
property to the state and join the state sector.' 4 By 1978 the number
of small farmers dropped to 137,000 and, more significantly, the
average small holding was in the neighborhood of 12.6 hectares,
representing a total of 20% of cultivated land in private hands.
Those who did not sell their land received "soft pressure"' 5
to voluntarily integrate into collective, albeit private farms. The
semi-private production cooperatives [hereinafter Cooperativas de
Production Agropecuaria or CPAs] are one example. Their
members are of two types: "contributory members" (those who
12. Id. at 1-2 (citing D. GHAI, ET AL., LABOR DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL CUBA
(1988). The International Labor Organization, in an ILO sponsored study
entitled, LAND AND DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL CUBA [hereinafter ILO Report],
reports that land registers are indeed kept at the municipal level, with rural land
classified under one of the following headings: State, Cooperative or Private.
13. All figures contained in this paragraph are taken from BULLETIN 16, supra
note 2.
14. Benjamin et al., supra note 8, at 96. Reports are that some "felt forced
more than persuaded" to sell to the state.
15. In the form of various incentives, including preferential access to
machinery, seeds, fertilizers, and credits. BULLETIN 16, supra note 2, at 2.
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have contributed land) and "non-contributory members" (those who
have not). There are over 1,300 production cooperatives, each
representing an average of 647 hectares farmed by forty-seven
workers. Most are involved in export oriented agriculture, with
sugar cane, tobacco, and coffee representing the major crops. A
provision is made for the production cooperative to buy out the
contributory members' interests over time.
Production cooperatives occupy a middle ground between
the public and private sector:
On the one hand, their organization is socialist - with
CPA members organized into specialized labor
brigades; property, with each CPA, is not
inheritable, and output is determined by the state.
On the other hand, their statutes describe the CPAs
as being privately (as opposed to explicitly State)
owned; CPAs are free to divide or merge into small
or bigger units, and, CPA members are technically
free to leave the coop [sic] when they wish ....'I
Hence the production cooperatives would benefit "from
economies of scale and a less individualized (and therefore 'higher')
stage of organization.' 7 A report of the International Labor
Organizatiion [hereinafter "ILO"] describes the production co-ops
as "self-managed collectives since the members who collectively
own the land and other means of production retain almost all their
profits and in general run their own affairs democratically."' 8
16. BULLETIN 16, supra note 2, at 3.
17. A. Ziinbalist & S. Eckstein, Patterns of Cuban Development: The First
Twenty-five Years, in THE CUBA READER: THE MAKING OF A REVOLUTIONARY
SOCIETY 132 (1989).
18. BULLETIN 16, supra note 2, at 3 (quoting ILO Report, supra note 12).
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The next two major categories of land tenure are the credit
and services co-ops and the small farmers. These are more
recognizable as private entities. Credit and services coops "share
some installations and services, but land, equipment and produce
are all privately owned." Title to land is transferable and
inheritable consistent with the above-mentioned constitutional
provisions. This fact is also true of the small farmer, who now
controls only about 2.2% of the cultivated land. Notwithstanding
these modest numbers, private farmers represent virtually the only
meaningful for-profit private economic activity in the Cuban
economy.' 9 Yet, as the ILO reports, "ultimate extinction appears
virtually inevitable. "2
III. HOUSING
Article 22 of the 1976 constitution "guarantees the right to
personal ownership... of the dwelling to which one had legal title
and of the other possessions and objects which serve to satisfy one's
material and cultural needs." Cubans'may either own or lease their
homes or apartments. Even before the Revolution, Cuban renters
enjoyed significant protection in the form of rent controls and a
right to permanent occupancy. 2' Since the Castro regime, three
major housing legislative packages have been enacted: The 1960
Urban Reform Act, The 1984 Housing Law, and The 1988 Housing
Law.
Over time, The 1960 Urban Reform Act converted more
than half of the urban tenants in Cuba into landowners.Y The
19. GHAI, supra note 12, at 124.
20. Id. at 83.
21. Hamberg, supra note 1, at 37.
22. BULLETIN 15, supra note 2, at 2. For a detailed examination of the various
articles contained in the 1960 Urban Reform Law, see MARUJA AcOsTA & JORGE
E. HARDOY, URBAN REFORM IN REVOLUTIONARY CUBA 61 (Mal Bochner trans.,
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remainder, living in slum tenement buildings, eventually received
long-term rent-free leases. 3 Most landlords were compensated, but
slum landlords were not.24 An individual could theoretically own
one primary residence and one vacation home? 5 Almost all private
renting or subletting was declared illegal and rents for government-
built housing were capped at no more than 10 percent of household
income.26 Between 1959 and 1988, just over 1.4 million units were
added to the housing stock, fully two-thirds of which represented
"self-built," and not government-built, housing.27 The situation
reflects the relatively low priority which the government placed on
meeting the demand for housing in favor of infrastructure, schools,
and industrial plants. 28 Nevertheless these numbers represent an
87% increase in housing units for the period, which saw just a 58%
growth in population.29 One Cuba watcher, no admirer of the
current regime, reports that "[w]ell over 1 million Cubans have
become homeowners since 1959. Although there is an extreme
poverty of data on private home ownership in Cuba, of a total
1971) [hereinafter Urban Reform].
23. Hamberg, supra note 1, at 38.
24. Id.
25. Urban Reform, supra note 22, at 65.
26. Hamberg, supra note 1, at 57.
27. Id. at 39.
28. C. Brundenius, Development Strategies and Basic Human Needs in THE
CUBA READER: THE MAKING OF A REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY 113 (1988).
29. Id. at 41.
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housing stock of approximately 2.75 million units, informed
estimates suggest that between 80% and 90% are privately
owned. 0
By the time the 1984 Housing Law was enacted, out of a
total of 2.5 million Cuban households, approximately 50% owned
their homes. 31 The 1984 Housing Law was intended "to extend
home ownership even further, especially among those households
that had lived, since 1960, as long-term usufruct lessees (a type of
life estate) of newly-built, government-constructed buildings."'
Almost one-half million families became homeowners under the law
by amortizing the price of their dwellings. The 1984 Housing Law
also allowed limited short-term private rentals and established a
National Housing Institute. The government established a
methodology for computing the so-called "legal price. "3 Despite
measures to liberalize the housing market, the State still maintained
its right to purchase a property at the legal price 4 However:
[b]ecause owning more than one permanent dwelling
remain[ed] illegal, it is highly unlikely that anyone
could make an ongoing business out of buying and
30. BULLETIN 15, supra note 2, at 2.
31. Hamberg, supra note 1, at 50.
32. Id. Housing vacated by newly emigrating families is treated the same as
government-built housing, i.e., sold to the newly installed tenants.
33. J. Hamberg, The Dynamics of Cuban Housing Policy, in CiwTicAL
PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 611 (1986). The legal price was based on the type
of construction, usable floor area, location, extra yard space, and depreciation.
Id.
34. Id.
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selling houses. The only way to make a "profit" is
to trade down, either by moving in with someone
else or to a unit of lesser value.'
The 1988 General Housing Law kept in force most of the
policies of the 1984 law. In addition, it provided for increased state
intervention in the construction and housing markets and further
restricted the right to buy and sell housing on the open market.
[O]vert speculation [under the 1984 Law] was so
rampant that the government clamped down and
began requiring that most sales be directly to the
state, except in the case of property transfers to close
relatives .... Because of all of these problems with
buying and selling, the most common way that
Cuban families move is by exchanging their units.'
Another observer reported that, under the 1988 law,
"[s]waps between large, high-quality residences and obvious
smaller, less-good residences are not allowed. Such a system leads
to speculation and profiteering .... [and] [h]ouses for exchange are
announced in classified advertisements, at bus stops, in windows
and in grocery stores. An estimated 20,000 exchanges take place
each year. "'  Prior government approval for such swaps is
normally not required unless the homes are located in Havana, the
Isle of Youth, or other areas specified according to the 1989 House
Swap Regulation."8
Another form of redistribution is inheritance:
35. Id. at 615.
36. Hamberg, supra note 1, at 54.
37. BULLETIN 15, supra note 2, at 6.
38. Id.
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Privately owned homes may be inherited, but a
distinction is made between the right to occupy the
dwelling and to receive its value. The current
occupants, if they had lived with the now-deceased
occupant for at least two years if close relatives, and
five years if not, cannot be thrown out whether or
not they are heirs. These occupants amortize the
value of the dwelling over a period of time to the
government, which, in turn, reimburses the heirs.39
Private residential owners record their title in a new
allegedly computerized Register, created under the 1988 Law
(Article 116).' The old Property Register, created by the Ley
Hipotecaria de EspaFia (1861), was established in 1893. After the
Revolution, most property transfers were not registered until the
computerized system was established. It is intended to include all
property transfers that have taken place since the Revolution. Scant
information about its efficacy or accuracy is available.
IV. COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES
In July 1992, the Cuban National Assembly significantly
modified or updated some of the main articles of the 1976 Cuban
constitution. These modifications, for all practical purposes,
nationalized what little private ownership over the means of
production survived from the earlier revolutionary period.
Article 14 had previously provided for "socialist ownership"
of all the people over all the means of production, while Article 15
39. Id. at 55-56.
40. BULLETIN 15, supra note 2, at 6.
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listed the "irreversible" nature of state ownership over a long, non-
exclusive list of productive enterprises, including mills, factories,
transport, communications, and banks.41
The relevant provisions, as modified follow (emphasis
added):
Article 14:
An economic system based on the socialist
ownership of all the people over the basic means of
production and the elimination of the exploitation of
man by man rules in the Republic of Cuba.
Article 15:
The following are the socialist state properties of all
the people:
(a) the land which does not belong to the small
producers or the cooperatives, the subsoil, the
mines, the maritime and natural resources - both
living and non-living - within the economic area of
the republic, the forests, the waters and the means of
communication;
(b) the sugar mills, factories, basic means of
transport and all the enterprises, banks, installations
and goods that have been nationalized and
expropriated from the imperialists, large landholders
and members of the bourgeoisie [or built by the
state] ....
These properties and installations cannot be
transferred to any persons or corporations, except in
41. See supra note 3, at CUBA CONST. arts. 14, 15.
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cases in which the property is transferred in order to
be used in the economic and social development of
the country . . .with the prior approval of the
Council of Ministers or its Executive Committee.42
The changes also embraced a recognition of freedom of
religion, a stricter definition of Cuban citizenship, and a broadening
of the definition of the Communist Party to include the ideals of the
Cuban nationalist and hero Jose Marti.43 Electoral reform was also
included.' Some seasoned Cuba watchers were cautiously
optimistic: "This is the type of legislation that Hungary was
introducing when it began to move toward a market-oriented
economy," one said. 45 Another noted that "[the changes] open up
the potential for ownership of small businesses and even medium-
sized businesses by foreigners and maybe even by Cubans some
day." "Of course, I don't see this happening- in the near future,"
said another. Others were more sanguine: "I don't think these
changes mean much to people's daily lives in Cuba, [rather] I look
at them as an elitist maneuver to try to make the system more
flexible so it will survive in the short and medium term. ,46
42. Summary of World Broadcasts - The Middle East, Africa and Latin
America, ME/1442/D/1 (British Broadcasting Corp., July 25, 1992).
43. Mimi Whitefield, Cuba Ratifies New Constitution: Private Property Now
OK, MIAMI HERALD, July 13, 1992, at 1A, 8A.
44. Summary of World Broadcasts - The Middle East, Africa and Latin
America, ME114441D11 (British Broadcasting Corp., July 28, 1992). See also
Cuba's New Constitution: Better or Worse, 1 THE CUBA REPORT 1 (1992)
[hereinafter Cuba Report]. This latter source appropriately points out the
ominous fact that Castro has been given greater control over the Cuban military
and increased powers to declare a state of war of emergency, amounting to de
jure recognition of his existing defacto powers.
45. Whitefield, supra note 43, at 8A.
46. Id.
19951
150 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
V. CONCLUSION
Clearly, there can be considerable divergence between
Cuban law and Cuban reality. The Speaker of the Cuban National
Assembly, for instance, cautioned observers: "Let the enemy not
be deceived. They will find nothing in this [revised Constitutional]
text that implies retreat, nor a return to the past, because we bow
to no pressure. 47
Indeed, in light of recent Cuban history, skepticism is in
order:
The amendments presumably provide the predicate
for future policy changes by the Cuban government
and also provide constitutional recognition and
authorization for many activities which the Cuban
government has undertaken in its efforts to meet
both the drastic economic changes and economic
freefall, and the world political changes. The extent
to which the amendments will provide a more open
and mixed economy and, more importantly, a new,
better and different economic and personal life for
Cubans remains to be seen.48
47. Cuba Report, supra note 44, at 1.
48. Id.
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